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TAXATION OF ACCIDENT AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES
RUSSELL H. MATTHIAS AND HERBERT H. NAUJOKS
PART ONE
A. INTRODUCTION.
One of the important items to be considered in the operation of the
insurance business is the matter of taxes, both federal and state. Chief
Justice Marshall in his famous dictum, in the case of McCulloch v.
Maryland,1 suggested that "the power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy." And the United States Supreme Court in more recent times
"has recognized that a statute purporting to tax may be so arbitrary and
capricious as to amount to confiscation. ' 2 Confiscation of property or
business by means of arbitrary taxation may be as definite and real a
menace as any that can be suggested.
What, then, is this thing called "tax" that can be made burdensome
and even destructive and yet which obviously is essential to the main-
tenance of our American form of political society? Where does the
government, federal, state, or local, derive its authority to wield so
potent a power? What, if any, are the limitations upon the power to
tax? What are the requirements of the statutes, state and federal, and
of the local ordinances with reference to the taxation of accident and
health insurance companies? What is the future of these companies in
so far as taxes are concerned? And what, if anything, can be done
about this perennial problem of taxes? These are some of the questions
that must be considered in order to understand rightly the problem of
taxation as it affects the insurance business, and particularly accident
and health insurance companies.
B. THE NATURE OF TAXES.
Cooley,' in his much quoted work on Taxation, defines taxes as "the
enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied
by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government
and for all public needs."
The United States Supreme Court has defined taxes as "an enforced
contribution to provide for the support of government."4 Another
court has stated that taxes are "an enforced contribution of money or
other property, assessed in accordance with some reasonable rule of
apportionment by authority of a sovereign state on persons or property
14 Wheat. 316, 431, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
2 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542, 71 L. Ed. 1184, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927).
3Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed., Vol. I, p. 61.
4 United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572, 75 L. Ed. 551, 51 S. Ct. 278(1931).
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within its jurisdiction, for the purpose of defraying the public ex-
penses."5
It should be noted that, as indicated in the foregoing definitions, one
of the fundamental characteristics of a tax is that it is not a voluntary
donation or payment, but an enforced contribution exacted in accord-
ance with legislative authority, the contribution being of a proportionate
character, and usually payable in money and imposed and collected for
the purpose of raising funds to be used solely for public purposes.
C. THE THEORY OF TAXATION.
The prevailing theory of taxation is that taxes are levied upon per-
sons, businesses or property for the support of government in return
for the benefits and protection which the government affords the tax-
payer and his property or business.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has pointed out :6
"The basic idea of exercise of the taxing power and justifica-
tion for it, is that, it involves an exchange of equivalents. The
taxing district obtains the contribution to the public treasury and
the contributor, in return, receives a legal consideration of a
pecuniary or protective nature to his person or his property or
both. It is often difficult to appreciate just where the considera-
tion comes in, but without it, in fact, the taking of one's proper-
ty, though under the form of taxation, and, so, in form, by due
process of law, would be confiscation,--an appropriation of pri-
vate property for a non-public use, even though, in the particu-
lar case, the public might be interested in the enterprise pro-
moted, and be largely, incidentally, benefited."
In Youngblood v. Sexton,7 Mr. Justice Cooley said:
"It may be supposed that some idea of special protection is
involved when a business is taxed; taxation and protection being
reciprocal. If the tax upon any particular thing was the consid-
eration for the protection given to the owner in respect to it,
this might be so; but the maxim of reciprocity in taxation has
no such meaning. No government ever undertakes to tax all it
protects. If a government were to levy only poll taxes, it would
not be on the idea that it was to protect only the persons of its
citizens, leaving their property open to rapine and plunder. In
this State our taxes are derived mainly from real estate; but it
has never been suggested that real estate was entitled to special
considerations in consequence. * * * Whether a person in respect
to his property or his occupation falls within the category of
taxables or not is immaterial as affecting his claim to protection
from the government. It is enough for him that the government
has selected for itself its own subjects for taxation, and pre-
scribed its own rules. It is his liability to taxation at the will of
5 French Republic v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 21, 252 S.W. 124 (1923).6 State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 N.W. 331, 366 (1916).
732 Mich. 406, 421, 20 Am. Rep. 654, 664 (1875).
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the government that entitles him to protection, and not the cir-
cumstances of his being actually taxed. * * *"
The justification for taxes rests in the reciprocal duties of protection
and support between the state and those who are subject to its author-
ity. The person upon whom the demand for taxes is made owes to the
state a duty to contribute his just proportion toward support of the
government and the state in turn gives protection to his life, property,
and business.
PART Two
A. POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO TAX INSURANCE COM-
PANIES.
(1) In general.
Under the federal law the principal tax to which an insurance com-
pany may be subject is the income tax.8 The federal old age pension
tax and the federal unemployment tax also apply to insurance com-
panies.9 The power which Congress possesses to levy taxes is obtained
from the Federal Constitution,"0 which provides:
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States."
Under the broad provisions of the above quoted Article of the Con-
stitution, Congress is given authority to levy and collect sundry and var-
ious types of taxes. As the Court suggested in the leading case of
Pollock 'v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,' the above classification, despite
intimations to the contrary, is probably broad enough to include every
kind of tax known to exist.
Art. 1, Sec. 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution provides that "no Capi-
tation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."
This provision was adopted for the purpose of equalizing the tax
burden among the several states. At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution a tax on real estate without apportionment would have
been confiscatory owing to the fact that in the South there existed large
areas of land and only very few people. In the North, however, there
was a large population and but very little land and, hence, such a tax
would not have been unduly burdensome to that section of the country.
8 See U.S.C.A. Title 26, sections 201, 204, 207, et seq. and pocket supplement.
9 See U.S.C.A. Title 26, sections 1400 et seq. and 1600 et seq. and pocket sup-plement and U.S.C.A. Title 42, section 1001 et seq. and pocket supplement.
10 United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1.
21 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601, 39 L. Ed. 759, 1108 (1895). In Brushaber v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 12, 60 L. Ed. 493, 36 S. Ct. 236 (1915), the Court
said: "That the authority conferred upon Congress by Sec. 8 of Article 1 'to lay
and collect taxes, duties and imposts and excises' is inexhaustive and embraces
every conceivable power of taxes has never been questioned* * *"
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The framers of the Constitution sought to secure equality by the adop-
tion of a rule of apportionment making the heavily populated sections
of the nation bear the greatest burden while lightening the burden of
taxation on the fewer people residing in the sparsely settled communi-
ties. The rule of apportionment means simply that after the total
amount of taxes to be raised by direct taxation has been decided upon,
that sum will be divided among the several states according to their
population and assessed at a rate to be determined by dividing the total
value of the property within the state subject to the tax into the amount
apportioned to that state. 2
Prior to the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment a tax upon in-
come was within the power of Congress to levy but an income tax was
then held to be a direct tax upon property and was unconstitutional un-
less apportioned among the states.' 3 This led to the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment which removed the necessity which otherwise
existed for apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income.
However, that Amendment did not extend the taxing power of Con-
gress to new subjects, but merely took away the necessity of apportion-
ing the taxes laid on income.
(2) Taxation of income under the Sixteenth Amendment.
The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration."
This Amendment was submitted to the legislatures of the various
states on July 31, 1909 (36 Stat. 84). The Secretary of State in a
proclamation dated February 25, 1913, declared the Amendment to have
been ratified by the necessary number of states.'1 However, for con-
venience it was made effective by Congress on March 1, 1913.
In considering the Sixteenth Amendment, the United States Su-
preme Court in the leading case of Eisner v. Macomber,15 said:
"A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear
language, requires also that this Amendment shall not be ex-
tended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as
applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that re-
quire an apportionment according to population for direct taxes
upon property, real and personal. This limitation still has an ap-
12 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. Ed. 482 (1869).
13 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920) ; Pollock
v. Famners Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601, 39 L. Ed. 759, 1108,
15 S. Ct. 673, 912 (1895).
1437 Stats. 1785 (1913).
Is 252 U.S. 189, 206, 64 L. Ed. 521, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
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propriate and important function, and is not to be overridden by
Congress or disregarded by the courts.
"In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from Article 1 of
the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as
modified by the Amendment, and that the latter also may have
proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what
is and -what is not 'income,' as the term is there used; and to ap-
ply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and sub-
stance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any defini-
tion it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legisla-
tion alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power
to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can
be lawfully exercised."
(3) What is income?
In the case of Eisner v. Macomber"" the United States Supreme
Court considered the meaning of income under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, and said:
"The fundamental relation of 'capital' to 'income' has been
much discussed by economists, the former being likened to the
tree or the land, the latter to the fruit or the crop; the former
depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs, the latter as the
outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of time.
For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the
term 'income,' as used in common speech, in order to determine
its meaning in the Amendment; and, having formed also a cor-
rect judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find
it easy to decide the matter at issue.
"After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouvier's
Law Dict.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Int. Dict.; Century Dict.),
we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two
cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of August 5, 1909
(36 Stat. at L. 11, chap. 6), (Stratton's Independence v. How-
bert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 58 L. ed. 285, 292, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136;
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 62 L. ed. 1054,
1059, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 467) : 'Income may be defined as the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' pro-
vided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or
conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle
Case (pp. 183, 185).
"Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguish-
ing attribute of income, essential for a correct solution of the
present controversy. The Government, although basing its argu-
ment upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis upon
the word 'gain,' which was extended to include a variety of
meanings; while the significance of the next three words was
either overlooked or misconceived; 'Derived-from-capital';
'the gain-derived-from-capital,' etc. Here we have the es-
sential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or
16252 U.S. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920).
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increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, some-
thing of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, sev-
ered from the capital however invested or employed, and com-
ing in, being 'derived,' that is, received or drawn by the recipient
(the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit, and disposal ;-that
is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the de-
scription.
"The same fundamental conception is clearly set forth in the
Sixteenth Amendment-'incomes, from whatever source derived'
-the essential thought being expressed with a conciseness and
lucidity entirely in harmony with the form and style of the Con-
stitution."
In United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Company, 7 in
discussing the meaning of income, the Court said:
"In February, 1913, if our analysis of the facts is accurate,
there was a contested and contingent claim for profits, not fairly
to be characterized as income for that year or earlier. In 1925
this inchoate and disputed claim became consummate and estab-
lished. It was now something more than a claim. It was income
fully accrued, and taxable as such. Till then the patentee had its
capital, the patent, and an expectancy of income, or income, more
accurately, in the process of becoming. Thereafter it had some-
thing different. No doubt the income thus accrued derived sus-
tenance and value from the soil of past events. We do not iden-
tify the seed with the fruit that it will yield.
"Income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is
the fruit that is born of capital, not the potency of fruition. With
few exceptions, if any, it is income as the word is known in the
common speech of men. When it is that, it may be taxed, though
it was in the making long before (citations omitted)."
And, in Helvering v. Independent L. Ins. Co.,' the Court said:
"Unquestionably Congress has power to condition, limit or
deny deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net
that it chooses to tax."
In view of the foregoing it is clear that the term "income" as used
in the Sixteenth Amendment does not refer to gross receipts, but rather
to gross receipts less such deductions as Congress chooses to allow. Of
course, capital cannot be taxed and before there can be any income
there must be gain. 9
Another interesting case on this subject is MacLaughlin v. Alliance
Insurance Company.20 In this case a'Pennsylvania stock fire and ma-
rine insurance company received a profit from the sale in 1928 of prop-
- 297 U.S. 88, 99, 80 L. Ed. 500, 56 S. Ct. 353 (1936).
1s292 U.S. 371, 381, 78 L. Ed. 1311, 54 S. Ct. 758 (1934); See also North
American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 76 L. Ed. 1197, 52 S. Ct.
613 (1932) ; Spring City Foundry Co. v. Cmnmissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 78 L. Ed.
1200, 54 S. Ct. 644 (1934).
19 Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 75 L. Ed. 1143, 51 S. Ct. 550 (1931).
20 286 U.S. 244, 76 L. Ed. 1083, 52 S. Ct. 538 (1932).
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erty acquired before that time. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
assessed a tax against the company, which was arrived at by including
in the taxable income all of the gains attributable to the increase in
value of the property after March 1, 1913, and realized by the sale in
1928. The company contended that only so much of the gain as accrued
after the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1928 could constitution-
ally be taxed, and it was upheld in this contention by the lower court.
The Supreme Court, in denying the claim of the taxpayer and uphold-
ing the position of the Government, said:
"The tax under this and earlier revenue acts was imposed
upon net income for stated accounting periods, here the calendar
year, 1928, * * * and it is only gain realized from the sale or
other disposition of property, which is included in the taxable in-
come. Realization of the gain is the event which calls into opera-
tion the taxing act, although part of the profit realized in one ac-
counting period may have been due to increase of value in an
earlier one. While increase in value of property, not realized as
gain by its sale or other disposition, may, in an economic or book-
keeping sense, be deemed an addition to capital in a later period,
it is nevertheless a gain from capital investment which, when
realized, by conversion into money or other property, constitutes
profit which has consistently been regarded as income within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and taxable as such in
the period when realized.
"Here there is no question of a tax on enhancement of value
occurring before March 1, 1913, the effective date of the income
tax act of that year, for the Collector asserts no right to tax such
increase in value. The fact that a part of the taxed gain, repre-
sented increase in value after that date, but before the present
taxing act, is without significance. Congress, having constitu-
tional power to tax the gain, and having established a policy of
taxing it, may choose the moment of its realization and the
amount realized, for the incidence and the measurement of the
tax. Its failure to impose a tax upon the increase in value in the
earlier years, assuming without deciding that it had the power,
cannot preclude it from taxing the gain in the year when real-
ized, any more than in any other case, where the tax imposed is
upon realized, as distinguished from accrued, gain. If the gain
became capital by virtue of the increase in value in the years
before 1928, and so could not be taxed as income, the same
would be true of the enhancement of value in any one year after
the adoption of the taxing act, which was realized and taxed in
another. But the constitutionality of a tax so applied, has been
repeatedly affirmed and never questioned. The tax being upon
realized gain, it may constitutionally be imposed upon the entire
amount of the gain realized within the taxable period, even
though some of it represents enhanced value in an earlier period
before the adoption of the taxing act."
In determining what income is we must bear in mind that although
income is often defined as "the gain derived from capital, from labor,
[Vol. 32
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or from both combined," 21 yet Congress has broad powers, both to
grant deductions from gross income and to take away deductions. 22
In other words, as a practical matter taxable income is gross income
(not including capital investment) less deductions authorized by Con-
gress.
B. LIMITATIONS UPON THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO
LEV-Y TAXES.
(1) in general.
Contrary to opinions expressed by many uninformed people there
are certain constitutional limitations upon the power of the Federal
Government to levy the taxes authorized under the Constitution. Al-
though the power of Congress to levy taxes is very great, it is not un-
limited. We shall now consider briefly the limitations upon the power
of the Federal Government to levy taxes.
(2) Jurisdiction.
It is manifest that the power of the Federal Government to tax can-
not extend beyond its sovereignty. That is to say, the power to tax
must depend on jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be based either on (1)
citizenship of the person or corporation against whom the tax is levied,
(2) domicile, or (3) source of income.2
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the income of an American
citizen residing in Mexico was subject to the federal income tax, al-
though such income was derived wholly from property located outside
of the United States2 4 And, in the case of non-resident aliens the
power of the Government to levy income taxes depends on whether
there is any income from sources within the United States. Thus, in
DeGanay v. Lederer25 the Court held that the Federal Government had
power to tax a non-resident alien upon income received from a trust
comprised of intangible property administered by resident trustees
within the United States. And in Ingram v. Bowers" it was held that
royalties received by Enrico Caruso, an Italian subject, from the sale
of Victrola records, recorded in America but sold in foreign countries,
were subject to the federal income tax upon income from sources with-
in the United States. The theory of the statute and of the Court's de-
cisions is that since non-resident aliens enjoy the protection of the laws
21 Stratton's Independence Limited v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 58 L. Ed. 285,
34 S. Ct. 136 (1913).
22NeW Colonial Ice Company v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 78 L. Ed. 1348, 54
S. Ct. 788 (1934).
23 Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 77 L. Ed. 844, 53 S. Ct. 457, 86 A.L.R. 747
(1933).
24 Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 68 L. Ed. 895, 44 S. Ct. 444 (1924).
25 250 U.S. 376, 63 L. Ed. 1042, 39 S. Ct. 524 (1919).
26 57 Fed. (2d) 65 (1932).
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of the United States with respect to their income, they may be taxed
for the benefits received.
(3) Rule of uniformity.
The Constitution provides that duties, imposts and excises must be
uniform throughout the United States. That is, a tax cannot be levied
at one rate in one locality and at another rate in another locality upon
the same object or business, nor may Congress exempt from taxation
taxpayers of a certain class located in one part of the country and not
taxpayers of the same class living in another part of the country. The
effect of the Sixteenth Amendment was to treat the income tax on
incomes from real and personal property as an indirect tax rather than
as a direct tax. However, the Court never has treated the tax on in-
comes from business, trades, professions or employments as a direct
tax, but only the tax on incomes from real or personal property prior
to the Sixteenth Amendment.2 7 Therefore, since income taxes are not
direct taxes, the rule of uniformity applies to income taxes,2 8 which
rule under the Constitution is limited to excises, duties and imposts.
2 9
(4) Double taxation.
There is no constitutional objection to so-called "double-taxation,"
at least as far as the United States Constitution is concerned.3 0 Un-
fair though it may be, and the courts at times have characterized it as
such, nevertheless double taxation has been sustained against all attacks
as to its constitutionality.
(5) Retroactive taxation.
For more than half a century it has been settled that a law of Con-
gress imposing a tax may be retrospective in its operation.3 1
Each of the income tax acts adopted from time to time has been
retroactive, in that it applied to income earned prior to the passage of
the act, during the calendar year. The Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38
27 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 60 L. Ed. 493, 36 S. Ct. 236
(1915) ; Stanton v. Baltic Ain. Co., 240 U.S. 103, 60 L. Ed. 546, 36 S. Ct. 278
(1916).
28 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 60 L. Ed. 493, 36 S. Ct. 236
(1915) ; Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 75 L. Ed. 239, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
20 United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
30 Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U.S. 137, 68 L. Ed. 212, 44 S. Ct. 40 (1923) ; Hell-
nich v. Helhnan, 276 U.S. 233, 72 L. Ed. 544, 48 S. Ct. 244 (1928); Cream
of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325, 64 L. Ed. 931, 40 S. Ct. 558
(1920).
3' Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 20 Wall. 323, 331, 22 L. Ed. 348 (1873) ; Rail-
road Co. v. Rose, 95 U.S. 78, 80, 24 L. Ed. 376 (1877) ; Railroad Co. v. U. S.,
101 U.S. 543, 549, 25 L. Ed. 1068 (1879) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S.
107, 31 S. Ct 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B 1312 (1910); Billings v.
U. S., 232 U.S. 261, 282, 58 L. Ed. 596, 34 S. Ct. 421 (1914) ; Brushaber v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 20, 36 S. Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493 (1915);
Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 343, 38 S. Ct. 543, 62 L. Ed. 1149 (1918);
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 164, 44 S. Ct. 462, 68 L. Ed. 949 (1923) ; Welch
v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 83 L. Ed. 87, 59 S. Ct. 121 (1938).
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Stats. 114, 166, which taxed all incomes received after March 1, 1913,
was specifically upheld in Brusiaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 32 and
in Lynch v. Hornby.3 Some of the acts have taxed income earned in
an earlier year. The Joint Resolution of July 4, 1864, No. 77, 13 Stat.
417, imposed an additional tax on incomes earned during the calendar
year 1863; this additional tax being imposed after the taxes for the
year had been paid. In Stockdale v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 34 Mr. Jus-
tice Miller said:
"* * * no one doubted the validity of the tax or attempted to
resist it."
Except for the peculiar tax involved in Nichols v. Coolidge3 5 no
federal revenue measure has been held invalid on the score of retro-
activity. The need of government for revenue has always been deemed
a sufficient justification for making a tax measure retroactive whenever
the imposition seemed consonant with justice and the conditions were
not such as would ordinarily involve hardship.
(6) Arbitrary and capricious taxes.
While the power of Congress to levy and collect excise taxes is
very broad, it is not unlimited and the courts have ruled that arbitrary
and capricious taxes will not be sustained. This limitation on the power
of Congress is found in the Fifth rather than in the Sixteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. Thus, the Supreme Court in holding void a
portion of Sec. 402(c) of the Revenue Act of 1919 on the ground that
it was arbitrary and capricious, 3 said:
"This court has recognized that a statute purporting to tax
may be so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to confiscation
and offend the Fifth Amendment (citing cases). And we must
conclude that Sec. 402(c) of the statute here under considera-
tion, in so far as it requires that there shall be included in the
gross estate the value of property transferred by a decedent prior
to its passage merely because the conveyance was intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, is
arbitrary, capricious and amounts to confiscation. Whether or
how far the challenged provision is valid in respect of transfers
made subsequent to the enactment, we need not now consider."
C. THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW As APPLIED TO ACCIDENT AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES.
Under the federal law an insurance company other than life or
mutual is subject to the imposition of an income tax under the provi-
32 240 U.S. 1, 20, 60 L. Ed. 493, 36 S. Ct. 236 (1915).
33 247 U.S. 339, 343, 62 L. Ed. 1149, 38 S. Ct. 543 (1918).
34 20 Wall. 323, 331, 22 L. Ed. 348 (1873).
35274 U.S. 531, 71 L. Ed. 1184, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927).
36 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710, 71 L. Ed. 1184, 52 A.L.R.
1081, 1091 (1927).
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sions of Section 204, Title 26 U.S.C.A. Those life insurance companies
that are engaged in the business of issuing life policies including con-
tracts of combined life, health and accident insurance are subject to
taxation under the provisions of Sections 201, 202 and 203 of Title
26 U.S.C.A. Mutual companies other than life come under Sec. 207,
Title 26 U.S.C.A.
Section 201 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code relating to taxation
of life insurance companies, provides in part that
"(a) Imposition of tax.
(1) In general. There shall be levied, collected, and paid for
each taxable year upon the adjusted normal-tax net income (as
defined in section 202) and upon the adjusted corporation sur-
tax net income (as defined in section 203) of every life insur-
ance company taxes at the rates provided in section 13 or sec-
tion 14 (b) and in section 15 (b)."
Section 201(b) of the Internal Revenue Code defines a life insur-
ance company as one "which is engaged in the business of issuing life
insurance and annuity contracts (either separately or combined with
health and accident insurance) or noncancellable contracts of health
and accident insurance, and the life insurance reserves (as defined in
subsection (c) (2) ) plus unearned premiums and unpaid losses on
noncancellable life, health, or accident policies not included in life in-
surance reserves, of which comprise more than 50 per centum of its
total reserves."
Section 204(a) of the Internal Revenue Code relating to insurance
companies other than life or mutual provides in part as follows:
"There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable
year upon the normal-tax net income and upon the corporation
surtax net income of every insurance company (other than a life
or mutual insurance company) and every mutual marine insur-
ance company and every mutual fire insurance company exclu-
sively issuing either perpetual policies, or policies for which the
sole premium charged is a single deposit which (except for such
deduction of underwriting costs as may be provided) is refund-
able upon cancellation or expiration of the policy taxes at the
rates specified in section 13 or section 14(b) and in section
15(b)."
Section 207 of the Internal Revenue Code, relating to mutual in-
surance companies other than life or marine, provides in part as
follows:
"(a) Imposition of tax. There shall be levied, collected, and
paid for each taxable year upon the income of every mutual in-
surance company (other than a life or a marine insurance com-
pany or a fire insurance company subject to the tax imposed by
section 204 and other than an interinsurer or reciprocal under-
writer) a tax computed under paragraph (1) or paragraph (2)
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whichever is the greater and upon the income of every mutual
insurance company (other than a life or a marine insurance com-
pany or a fire insurance company subject to the tax imposed by
section 204) which is an interinsurer or reciprocal underwriter,
a tax computed under paragraph (3):
"(1) If the corporation surtax net income is over $3,000 a
tax computed as follows:
"(A) Normal tax. A normal tax on the normal-tax net in-
come, computed at the rates provided in section 13 or section
14(b), or 30 per centum of the amount by which the normal-tax
net income exceeds $3,000, whichever is the lesser; plus
"(B) Surtax. A surtax on the corporation surtax net in-
come, computed at the rates provided in section 15(b), except
that if the corporation surtax net income is not more than $6,000
the surtax shall be 12 per centum of the amount by which the
corporation surtax net income exceeds $3,000.
"(3) ***
"(B) Surtax. A surtax on the corporation surtax net in-
come, computed at the rates provided in section 15(b), or 28
per centum of the amount by which the corporation surtax net
income exceeds $50,000, whichever is the lesser. As amended
Nov. 8, 1945, 5:17 p.m., E.S.T., c. 453, Title I, Sec. 121(b), 59
Stat. 568."
Section 13 of the Internal Revenue Code provides in part as follows:
"(b) Imposition of tax. There shall be levied, collected, and
paid for each taxable year upon the normal-tax net income of
every corporation the normal-tax net income of which is more
than $25,000 (except a corporation subject to the tax imposed
by section 14, section 231 (a), Supplement G, or Supplement Q)
whichever of the following taxes is the lesser:
"(1) General rule. A tax of 24 per centum of the normal-
tax net income; or
"(2) Alternative tax (corporations with normal-tax net in-
come over $25,000, but not over $50,000). A tax of $4,250, plus
31 per centum of the amount of the normal-tax net income in
excess of $25,000."
Section 14 of the Internal Revenue Code provides in part as follows:
"(b) Corporations with normal-tax net incomes of not more
than $25,000. If the normal-tax net income of the corporation
is not more than $25,000, and if the corporation does not come
within one of the classes specified in subsection (c), (d), or (e)
of this section, the tax shall be as follows:
"Upon normal-tax net incomes not in excess of $5,000, 15
per centum.
"$750 upon normal-tax net incomes of $5,000, and upon
normal-tax net incomes in excess of $5,000, and not in excess of
$20,000, 17 per centum in addition of such excess.
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"$3,300 upon normal-tax net incomes of $20,000, and upon
normal-tax net incomes in excess of $20,000, 19 per centum in
addition of such excess."
Section 15 of the Internal Revenue Code provides in part as follows:
"(a) Corporation surtax net incom.ie. For the purposes of
this chapter, the term 'corporation surtax net income' means
the net income minus the credit for dividends received provided
in section 26 (b) and minus, in the case of a public utility) the
credit for dividends paid on its preferred stock provided in sec-
tion 26 (h). For the purposes of this subsection dividends re-
ceived on the preferred stock of a public utility shall be disre-
garded in computing the credit for dividends received provided
in section 26(b).
"(b) Imposition of tax. There shall be levied, collected, and
paid for each taxable year upon the corporation surtax net in-
come of every corporation (except a Western Hemisphere trade
corporation as defined in section 109, and except a corporation
subject to the tax imposed by section 231(a), Supplement G or
Supplement Q), a surtax as follows:
"(1) Surtax net incomes not over $25,000. Upon corpora-
tion surtax net incomes not over $25,000, 6 per centum of the
amount thereof.
"(2) Surtax net incomes over $25,000 but not over $50,000.
Upon corporation surtax net incomes over $25,000, but not over
$50,000, $1,500 plus 22 per centum of the amount of the corpor-
ation surtax net income over $25,000.
"(3) Surtax net incomes over $50,000. Upon corporation
surtax net incomes over $50,000, 14 per centum of the corpora-
tion surtax net income."
A number of questions have arisen from time to time concern-
ing the proper construction and interpretation of the above taxing sec-
tions of the internal revenue law. Thus, under Section 203, Title 26,
U.S.C.A. in the case of Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corporation v.
Commissioner,17 it was held that an insurance company in computing
income is entitled to deduct policy losses paid or accrued within the
taxable year, and in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
U. S. 38 it was held that the provision allowing life insurance companies
to deduct from income for tax purposes interest paid or "accrued" did
not permit deduction of interest on policy dividends credited but not
paid during the taxable year. In Rockford Life Insurance Company v.
Commissioner,"9 it was held that under the provision allowing life in-
surance companies "a reasonable deduction" for depreciation of proper-
ty, the deduction was limited to depreciation on only such furniture and
fixtures as were used in connection with the company's investment
3747 Fed. (2d) 582 (1931).
38288 U.S. 269, 77 L. Ed. 739, 53 S. Ct. 337 (1933).
39292 U.S. 382, 78 L. Ed. 1315, 54 S. Ct. 761 (1934).
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business. In National Life Insurance Company v. U. S. 40 it was held
that rents paid by a life insurance company to a separate corporation,
the stock of which was owned by the former, for space occupied by its
officers, were pot deductible from the gross income. In MacLaughlin v.
Alliance Insurance Company,41 it was held that Section 204 was valid
even though construed as taxing the entire gains by a stock fire insur-
ance company in 1928 from the sale of property acquired previously.
In Maryland Casualty Company v. U. S. 42 it was held that insurance
premiums collected by local agents, but which in conformance with
agency contracts were not transmitted to the company's treasury with-
in the calendar year were nevertheless a part of the gross income of
the company received by it during such year.
D. TAXATION UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT.
The Social Security Act went into effect on approval by the Presi-
dent on August 14, 1935. On May 24, 1937, the Federal Social Securi-
ty Act was held constitutional in all respects by the United States Su-
preme Court.43 This Act was designed primarily to do two things:
First, to provide security during their working years for all (with some
exceptions) who are dependent for their livelihood upon obtaining
work from others rather than upon obtaining a livelihood in their own
business; Second, to provide security from want in old age for workers
through a retirement pension program.
In construing the Social Security Act the courts have ruled that
since these sections are remedial, they require a construction which will
give effect to the intention of Congress considered in the light of the
mischief to be corrected and the end to be obtained.44 It is clear that
the taxing phase of the Act is incidental and secondary to the main
purpose of providing security for workers.
The Federal Social Security Act levies a tax in two respects. It first
imposes an excise tax on all employers of eight or more employees,
which tax is based on remuneration paid for employment. With the ex-
ception of certain specifically excluded employments, all services per-
formed in the United States are included in the term "employment."
The Federal Act does not attempt to set up a federal unemployment
compensation system but rather, by the use of a credit provision, or
tax offset, seeks to induce each state to enact its own unemployment
insurance law. To accomplish this purpose the taxpayer is allowed to
credit against the federal tax all contributions paid by him under any
40 4 Fed. Supp. 1000 (Ct. Cls., 1933).
4- 286 U.S. 244, 76 L. Ed. 1083, 52 S. Ct. 538 (1932).
42251 U.S. 342, 64 L. Ed. 297, 40 S. Ct. 155 (1920).
43 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 81 L Ed. 1307, 57 S. Ct. 904 (1937).
-1 Grace v. Magruder, 148 Fed. (2d) 679 (1945), certiorari denied, 326 U.S. 720,
90 L. Ed. 426, 66 S. Ct. 24 (1945).
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approved state unemployment compensation law. The excise tax levied
under this statute upon employers of eight or more is three per cent
of the total wages paid by the employer, less credits for contributions
to state unemployment funds under approved state unemployment
acts.
45
Secondly, an excise tax on employers and an income tax on em-
ployees under the Federal Old Age Benefit provisions of the Social
Security Act began to accrue on January 1, 1937. All employers, re-
gardless of the number of their employees, are subject to the excise
(payroll) tax under this Title of the Act, unless specifically exempt
thereunder. Also every employee under the age of sixty-five is subject
to the income tax under this Act, unless engaged in an exempted em-
ployment. Independent contractors are, of course, not employees.
The tax on both employer and employee is based on "wages" payable
for employment during the calendar year. The term "wages" is defined
in the Act as the remuneration up to the first $3,000 only, payable each
year to each employee. The basis upon which remuneration is paid and
the time of payment are immaterial in determining whether such re-
muneration constitutes wages.
Under the terms of the old law it was provided that during 1937
each employer must pay a tax of one per cent on the first $3,000
of each employee's wage and each employee must also pay one per
cent on his yearly wages, up to the first $3,000. This tax rate was
to have been increased one-half per cent every three years until, for
the year 1949 and thereafter, it was to have been fixed at three per
cent on the first $3,000 of each employee's annual wage. However, sub-
sequent amendments to this law have kept the tax rate at one per cent
yearly for both employers and employees, up to the first $3,000.00 of
the employee's yearly wages."
The employer is made responsible under the Act for the payment of
both his own and his employees' taxes. He is required to deduct the
amount of each employee's tax from wage payments, as and when paid.
At the time each wage payment is made, the employer must furnish
a written statement to the employee showing the amount of employees'
tax deducted. It is immaterial that the wages are paid in some medium
other than money. Until collected from him the employee also is liable
for the employees' tax with respect to all wages received by him.
The employees' tax attaches at the time that the wages are either
actually or constructively received by the employee. Wages are con-
structively received when they are credited to the account of or set
apart for an employee so that they may be drawn upon by him at any
45 Section 1600 et seq., Internal Revenue Code, Title 26, U.S.C.A.
46 Section 1400 et seq., Internal Revenue Code, Title 26, U.S.C.A.
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time, although not then actually reduced to possession. Similarly, the
employers' tax attaches at the time that the wages are either actually
or constructively paid by the employer.
PART THREE
POWER OF THE STATE TO TAX ACCIDENT AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES
(1) Nature and source of power.
The power of the state to tax is not derived from a grant in a con-
stitution as is that of the Federal Government, but rather from its
inherent right of sovereignty. It is well settled that the power of
taxation rests upon necessity and is an essential attribute of sovereignty
belonging to every free state or government. Thus, the power of the
state to levy and collect taxes for public purposes is plenary and abso-
lute, except in so far as it is restrained by provisions of the Federal or
State Constitution or by inherent limitations, and extends to all persons
and property and business within its jurisdiction. The only security
against an abuse of the power of taxation by the state is found in the
safeguards provided in the Federal and State Constitutions, by certain
inherent limitations, and in the structure of government itself in that
in imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its constituents. When a tax
becomes unduly oppressive or burdensome the taxpayers affected will
usually adopt measures adequate to protect their interests. As one may
well recall, an abuse of the power of taxation was one of the causes of
the American Revolution and the ultimate establishment of the United
States of America.
(2) Limitation upon the power of the state to levy taxes.
(a) Jurisdiction.
Since the jurisdiction of the state does not extend beyond its terri-
torial limits, it cannot lawfully impose taxes upon persons, natural or
artificial, or property, residing or situated beyond such limits.4 7 In a
case where neither owner nor property is within the state, no protection
is afforded by that government and there is nothing for which taxation
can be equivalent. A tax on property or interests beyond the terri-
torial limits of the state constitutes a taking of property without due
process of law. 8 As was well said in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kan-
sas 4
"It is firmly established that, consistently with the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution of the United States, a State can-
7 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355, 30 S. Ct. 190(1910).
4 sMetropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395, 51 L. Ed. 853, 27 S.
Ct. 499 (1907).
49 216 U.S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 355, 30 S. Ct. 190 (1910).
1948]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
not tax property located or existing permanently beyond its
limits."
The rule above quoted applies likewise to persons, artificial or nat-
ural, over whom the state has no jurisdiction, and a tax levied against
them or against their property constitutes a taking of property without
due process of law.60
(b) Taxation for private purposes.
One of the limitations on the power of the state which inheres in
its very nature, whether declared or not in the state constitution, is the
want of power to tax for a private purpose. In Jones v. Portland;" the
Supreme Court said:
"It is well settled that moneys for other than public purposes
cannot be raised by taxation, and that exertion of the taxing
power for merely private purposes is beyond the authority of the
State."
Although the legislature has, in the first instance, a large discretion in
determining the objects for which a tax shall be levied, its decision is
not final, and the question, what is a public purpose, is one of law for
the courts to decide.
5 2
(c) Taxation of federal agencies.
While there is no express provision in the Federal or State Con-
stitution forbidding the state to tax properties of the Federal Govern-
ment or of agencies or instrumentalities thereof it is the universal rule
that such property is not taxable by the state.- This prohibition applies
equally well to a privilege tax imposed on a federal instrumentality for
the privilege of performing its functions. 4
(d) Impairment of obligations of contract.
Article I, Sec. 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, pro-
vides that no state shall impair the obligations of a contract. This sec-
tion applies as well to state contracts as to private contracts.
5 5
The rule that a state cannot impair the obligations of a private con-
tract, however, does not mean that a state may not impose a lawful
tax on a new subject or an increased tax on an old subject without im-
pairing the obligations of contract. Thus the Court held that a tax on in-
50 Provident Say. Life Assur. Soc. v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103, 60 L. Ed. 167, 36
S. Ct. 34 (1915).
51 245 U.S. 217, 62 L. Ed. 252, 38 S. Ct. 112 (1917).
52Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1, 28 L. Ed. 896, 5 S. Ct. 416"(1885); Citizens
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663, 22 L. Ed. 455 (1875).
53 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819) ; Indian Motorcycle
Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1277, 51 S. Ct. 601 (1931).
54 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania, 240 U.S. 319, 60 L. Ed. 664, 36 S. Ct.
298 (1916).
55 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).
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surance premiums would not impair the obligations in an insurance
contract within the purview of the Federal Constitution4 6
(e) State income tax.
The law is now well settled that a state if authorized to impose an
income tax has the power to levy a tax upon the income of all residents,
regardless of whether such income is derived from sources within or
without the state 7 and in the case of a non-resident the state may
levy such a tax if the income is derived from property situated within
the state or from a business carried on therein.*'
The same rules apparently apply in the case of corporations as apply
in the case of individuals. Thus, a domestic corporation, being a crea-
ture of the state, appears to be taxable on income arising from sources
outside the state59
In so far as foreign corporations are concerned, it appears to be
settled that they are taxable only with respect to income from sources
within the state. However, a state may, in determining the taxable
income of a foreign corporation, apply a formula for determining the
proportionate income subject to state tax of a foreign corporation do-
ing both intrastate and interstate business °0
A state cannot, however, constitutionally impose an income tax on
income derived from the sale of securities by a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in the state and carrying on its principal busi-
ness in the state, under a statute providing that a foreign corporation
whose business is carried on or transacted in the state shall be deemed a
resident for income tax purposes. 1
(f) Interstate or foreign commerce.
The state has no power to interfere in any way by taxation with
interstate or foreign commerce. It is the law today that insurance is
commerce and, if the business of insurance is conducted across state
lines it constitutes interstate commerce.6 2 Therefore, this limitation is
of utmost importance in connection with the taxation of insurance com-
panies by the several states. In Prudential Life Ins. Co. v'. Benjamin63
56 Home Insurance Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 93 U.S. 116, 23 L. Ed. 825
(1876).
5 Lawrence v. Tax Coninission, 286 U.S. 276, 76 L. Ed. 1102, 52 S. Ct. 556
(1932).
58 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 64 L. Ed. 445, 40 S. Ct. 221 (1920).591Matson Navigation Co. v. California, 297 U.S. 441, 80 L. Ed. 791, 56 S. Ct.
553 (1936).
60 Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 75 L. Ed. 879, 51 S. Ct.
385 (1931).
62 Newport Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 219 Wis. 293, 100 A.L.R. 1204, 261
N.W. 884 (1935).
62 United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533, 88 L. Ed.
1440, 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944), overruling Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed.
357 (1869).63328 U.S. 408, 90 L. Ed. 1342, 66 S. Ct. 1142 (1946).
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the Supreme Court upheld a South Carolina premium tax statute that
levied a three per cent premium tax on foreign insurance companies
and levied no premium tax on domestic insurance companies.
(g) Bonds or securities of the United States.
A state may not tax bonds or securities of the United States nor
may it tax the interest derived from tax exempt securities, for to do
so would be an interference with the power conferred upon Congress
in the United States Constitution to borrow money.64 Such a tax would
be unconstitutional under the rule first announced in McCulloch v.
Maryland5 that without Congressional action there is immunity from
state and local taxation implied from the Constitution itself of all prop-
erties, functions and instrumentalities of the Federal Government.
However, a state has power to levy on a franchise a tax measured by
net assets or net income, including tax exempt federal instrumental-
ities or their income.6 6
(h) Equal protection of the laws.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, no
state may deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of laws. A corporation has been held to be a person within the
meaning of this provisionY.7 Thus, while a state may not make arbi-
trary classifications for the purpose of taxation, yet it has the power to
classify property or occupations on some basis having a fair and rea-
sonable relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons sim-
ilarly situated will be treated alike. Hence, if a state treats all persons
in a similar class alike, it may classify, for purposes of taxation, prop-
erties, occupations, businesses, trades or callings."8 A state under this
provision may constitutionally impose upon foreign corporations li-
censed to do business in the state for the privilege of doing business
within the state more onerous conditions than it imposes upon do-
mestic corporations, and may exact from foreign corporations a tax
or rate of tax other than that imposed upon domestic corporations of
like character. 9
64 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 275 U.S. 136, 72 L. Ed. 202, 48 S. Ct.
55 (1927).
654 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
66 Tradesmen's Nat'l. Bank v. Okla. Tax Convin., 309 U.S. 560, 84 L. Ed. 947,
60 S. Ct. 688 (1940).67 Grosjean v. American Press Co. Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660, 56 S. Ct.
444 (1936).
68 State Tax Commissioner v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 75 L. Ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct.
540 (1931).
69 Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 89 L. Ed. 1861, 65 S. Ct.
1220 (1945). But also see Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr, 272 U.S. 494, 71 L.
Ed. 372, 47 S. Ct. 179 (1926).
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(i) Due process of law.
Under the express provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, no state
has power to deprive a person of property without due process of law.
A corporation is also treated as a person within the meaning of the due
process clause and, therefore, a state, while it may impose conditions
upon the right of a foreign corporation to enter the state to do business
therein, may not impose such conditions as would require the relin-
quishment of the foreign corporation's constitutional rights,7 0 nor may
a state take from a foreign corporation its property without due pro-
cess of law.7'
(j) Discrimination against citizens.
Article IV, Sec. 2, Clause 1, of The Federal Constitution provides
that citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the several states. This section insofar as taxa-
tion is concerned applies only to discrimination against citizens of other
states, who operate a business or own property in the taxing state, at a
higher rate than its own citizens are taxed under the same circum-
stances.7 2 It has been held, however, that corporations are not citizens
within the meaning of this constitutional provision.7 3 This section has
been before the Court many times under varying circumstances.7 4
The Fourteenth Amendment goes further than the Fourth Amend-
ment and forbids a state from abridging the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, whether its own citizens or others.
The courts have had this particular section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment before them but very little and, hence, no specific or compre-
hensive enumeration has been made of the privileges and immunities
which are protected thereunder. 5
(3) State taxation of insurance companies.
(a) Validity of state tax on premiums.
The validity of a tax on insurance companies often depends upon
whether the tax is in fact an excise or privilege tax or is merely a prop-
erty tax designated as an excise. As was well stated by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Educational Films Corporation v.
Ward :7
"* * *the nature of a tax must be determined by its opera-
tion rather than by particular descriptive language which may
70 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 70 L. Ed. 664, 46 S. Ct. 331
(1926).71 McFarland v. A'merican Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 60 L. Ed. 899, 36 S.
Ct. 498 (1916).
72 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 20 L. Ed. 449 (1871).
73 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869).74 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 64 L. Ed. 445, 40 S. Ct. 221 (1920).
5 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 80 L. Ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935).76282 U.S. 379, 75 L. Ed. 400, 51 S. Ct. 170 (1931).
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have been applied to it. * * * 'neither state courts nor legislatures,
by giving the tax a particular name, or by using some form of
words, can take away our duty to consider its nature and effect
* * * this Court must determine for itself by independent inquiry
whether the tax here is what, in form and by the decision of the
state court, it is declared to be.'"
And in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pennsylvania7 7 the
Court said:
"* * * it is argued that this is a property tax. But, as we have
said, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania speaks of it as a tax
for the privilege of doing business within the Commonwealth,
and whether the statement is a construction of the act or not
we agree with it so far at least- as to assume that if that charac-
terization is necessary to sustain the tax, the Legislature meant
to avail itself of any power appropriate to that end."
It appears to be the weight of authority that an excise tax upon
insurance companies measured by gross premiums is constitutional
where it is in the nature of a license tax for the privilege of doing
business within the state."' Thus, it has been held that a state acts con-
formably with the Federal Constitution when it imposes upon foreign
insurance companies a privilege tax based upon the amount of premi-
ums received by the company although the tax exceeds that exacted of
domestic companies.79 Also a privilege tax upon foreign insurance
companies was held valid even though domestic insurance companies
were exempted from the tax altogether.3 0 Conversely a privilege tax
on domestic insurance companies measured by premiums received was
held not to be unconstitutional even though foreign insurance com-
panies were exempted from the operation of the statute.3 1
However, in Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding,82 a state statute
imposing a tax measured by net receipts of foreign insurance com-
panies at the same rate of taxation as that imposed upon other personal
property and providing that such tax shall be in lieu of all town and
municipal taxes, was held void as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. Here domestic insurance companies were required to pay
no tax upon net receipts, for the tax as levied was not in fact a license
7238 U.S. 143, 59 L. Ed. 1239, 35 S. Ct. 829 (1915).
78N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 83 S. Car. 418, 65 S.E. 433 (1909) ; Mass. Bond-
ing & Ins. Co. v. Chorn, 274 Mo. 15, 201 S.W. 1122 (1918) ; Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132, 62 L. Ed. 1025, 38 S. Ct. 444 (1918).
79 Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410, 19 L. Ed. 972 (1871) ; Prudential Life Ins. Co.
v. Benja'inn, 328 U.S. 408, 90 L. Ed. 1342, 66 S. Ct. 1142 (1946) ; Fire Associa-
lion v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 30 L. Ed. 342. 7 S. Ct. 108 (1886).
so Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 90 L. Ed. 1342, 66 S. Ct.
1142 (1946).
31 Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132, 62 L. Ed. 1025,
38 S. Ct. 444 (1918).
82272 U.S. 494, 71 L. Ed. 372, 47 S. Ct. 179 (1926).
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tax, but a property tax with respect to which there was no constitution-
al ground for discrimination between foreign and domestic companies.
In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pennsylvaniam a privilege
tax imposed upon foreign life insurance companies measured by gross
premiums received from business done within the state was held not
to be unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law
although premiums paid to the company outside the state by residents
of the state were included in the gross premiums upon which the tax
was computed.
In Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin s4 the Court
held void a state statute providing that domestic insurance companies
shall pay a certain per cent of their gross income from all sources for
the privilege of transacting business within the state where such income
was construed to include income derived from United States bonds.
The Court held that the tax amounted to one upon property rather than
upon privileges or franchise of the company and pointed out the dis-
tinction between a tax measured by gross receipts and one measured
by gross returns.
However, in two leading cases the Supreme Court has sustained
corporation excise taxes which in effect taxed the income from federal
securities by measuring the tax by the net income of the corporation
from all sources.8 5
So also a state statute that imposed upon insurance corporations a
license tax based on a percentage of the gross premiums after deduct-
ing certain items was held valid and not violative of the state constitu-
tion which required that the property of corporations shall be subject to
taxation the same as that of individuals since the tax in question was
an excise tax and not one on property.8
(b) Requirements of statutes imposing a license tax on premiums.
There appears to be no uniformity in the requirements of the stat-
utes enacted by the several states levying premium taxes upon insur-
ance companies. Thus in some states a flat tax based on a percentage
of the gross receipts from premiums after deducting specified items
is imposed on both foreign and domestic insurance companies. In other
states the statutes tax foreign corporations, but exempt domestic in-
83238 U.S. 143, 59 L. Ed. 1239, 35 S. Ct. 829 (1915).
84 275 U.S. 136, 72 L. Ed. 202, 48 S. Ct. 55 (1927).
85 Pacific Company v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480, 76 L. Ed. 893, 52 S. Ct. 424 (1932);
Educational Films Corporation v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 75 L. Ed. 400, 51 S. Ct.
170 (1931); See also Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 89 L. Ed. 107, 65 S. Ct.
157 (1944) where it was held that without Congressional action there is im-
munity from state and local taxation implied from the Constitution itself of all
properties, functions and instrumentalities of the Federal Government.
86 Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Assoc. v. Gilbertson, 129 Ia. 658, 106 N.W. 153
(1906).
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surance corporations from the payment of a premium tax. It has been
held that such statutes are constitutional.8 7
In some states, as for example Alabama, the statutes require that
foreign insurance corporations pay a higher tax on premiums than do-
mestic corporations of the same kind. In Connecticut domestic com-
panies are taxed at the rate of two per cent of the gross premiums,
while foreign corporations are taxed only under the reciprocal pro-
visions of the insurance law which is at the rate that Connecticut com-
panies are taxed in the home state of the foreign companies whose
taxes are under consideration. In some states the rate of premium
taxes varies with the type of insurance dealt in, that is the rate for a
life company may be greater or smaller than the rate imposed upon a
casualty or fire company. And the rate itself varies all the way from
one and three-fourths per cent of the gross premiums as in Delaware to
three per cent of the gross premiums as in Idaho and a few other states.
In Oklahoma the premium tax is four per cent and in Texas this tax is
three and one-half per cent. In some states the rate fixed by the legis-
lature for premium taxes varies in so far as accident and health com-
panies are concerned depending on whether it is a life company au-
thorized to do an accident and health insurance business or whether it
is a casualty company doing that type of business.
This lack of uniformity in the taxing statutes of the several states
and the difficulty in determining at times the exact tax to be paid on
premiums because of the reciprocal provisions, would indicate that
steps should be taken to solve this problem by the enactment of uniform
premium tax laws in all the states. Such uniform legislation would re-
move many serious objections to the present laws of many of the states,
would make the administration of such laws much easier for the state
officers, and would certainly lighten the task in so far as the accident
and health company officials are concerned.
In determining the amount of taxes to be paid under the several
premium tax statutes notice must be taken of the items of deduction
allowed. In some states the statutes provide for the deduction of re-
turn premiums, reinsurance paid to admitted companies, premiums on
farm property, cancellations, losses, dividends or return from savings.
The statutes of the several states vary greatly in the deduction allow-
ances. In some states only return premiums and reinsurance paid ad-
mitted companies are allowable deductions. In other states one or more
of the items previously mentioned are authorized by statute to be de-
ducted from the gross premiums in computing the premium tax.
87 Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 90 L. Ed. 1342, 66 S. Ct.
1142 (1946); Aschen & M. Fire Ins. Co. v. Omaha, 72 Nebr. 518, 101 N.W. 3(1904); So. Building & Loan Assoc. v. Norman, 98 Ky. 294, 32 S.W. 952(1895); Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Chorn, 274 Mo. 15, 201 S.W. 1122 (1918).
[Vol. 32
TAXATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES
In construing the Kentucky statute the Attorney General of Ken-
tucky advised the Director of the Division of Insurance that the two
per cent premium tax on insurance business done in Kentucky applies
to group insurance and other types where premiums are sent directly
by the insured to the home office in another state. The Attorney Gen-
eral ruled that whether the business had been written by a Kentucky
agent or not made no difference so far as the applicability of the tax
was concerned and that the insurance carried on residents of Kentucky
and paid for by Kentucky business houses was Kentucky business with-
in the meaning of the premium tax statute. In Kentucky, as in many
other states, all taxes are subject to the retaliatory law.
(c) Retaliatory or reciprocal taxing statutes.
In many states of the Union the so-called retaliatory or reciprocal
taxing statutes have been enacted. For example, under Section 444 of
the Illinois Insurance Codel s it is provided:
"Whenever the existing or future laws of any other state or
country shall require of companies incorporated or organized
under the laws of this State as a condition precedent to their do-
ing business in such other state or country, compliance with
laws, rules, regulations and prohibitions more onerous or bur-
densome than the rules and regulations imposed by this State
on foreign or alien companies, or shall require any deposit of
securities or other obligations in such state or country, for the
protection of policyholders or otherwise or require of such com-
panies or agents thereof or brokers the payment of penalties,
fees, charges or taxes greater than the penalties, fees, charges or
taxes required in the aggregate for like purposes by this Code or
any other law of this State, of foreign or alien companies, agents
thereof or brokers, then such laws, rules, regulations and prohi-
bitions of said other state or country shall apply to companies in-
corporated or organized under the laws of such state or country
doing business in this State, and all such companies, agents
thereof, or brokers doing business in this State, shall be required
to make deposits, pay penalties, fees, charges and taxes, in
amounts equal to those required in the aggregate for like pur-
poses of Illinois companies doing business in such state or coun-
try, agents thereof or brokers. Whenever any other state or
country shall refuse to permit any insurance company incorpor-
ated or organized under the laws of this State to transact busi-
ness according to its usual plan in such other state or country,
the director may, if satisfied that such company of this State is
solvent, properly managed, and can operate legally under the
laws of such other state or country, forthwith suspend or cancel
the license of every insurance company doing business in this
State which is incorporated or organized under the laws of such
other state or country to the extent that it insures in this State
against any of the risks or hazards which are sought to be in-
88 Illinois Revised Statutes, 1947, Chapter 73, section 1056.
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sured against by the company of this State in such other state
or country. As amended by act approved July 21, 1941, L. 1941,
vol. 1, p. 837."
It is manifest that retaliatory statutes will affect an insurance cor-
poration with its home office in one state quite differently than an in-
surance corporation with its home office in a different state.
For example assume that State A has a retaliatory statute on its
books, and that State B then enacts a statute affecting all foreign com-
panies doing business within the state by imposing upon them obliga-
tions, conditions, fees or taxes in excess of those levied upon foreign
companies by State A. When State B enacts its statute, the retaliatory
one in State A becomes immediately operative, even though there are
no companies from State A doing business in State B at the time. Also
State A will treat the excessive provisions found in the statute of State
B as if found in so many words in its own statute when it enforces its
own statute against companies from State B which are doing business
in State A. A retaliatory statute being highly penal in nature will be
strictly construed and a foreign corporation will not be excluded from
the state under its provisions unless it is manifest that the effect of the
foreign law in its practical administration would be to exclude similar
companies organized under the laws of the state. In Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth,"9 the court held that the retaliatory statute
was intended only to create reciprocal relations between the taxation of
Massachusetts companies operating in another state and the taxation
of similar companies of that state operating in Massachusetts.
Retaliatory statutes have been uniformly upheld against many con-
stitutional objections and particularly the claim that they violate con-
stitutional provisions against unequal taxation.9"
In Alabama, however, in the face of the United States Supreme
Court decision and the decisions of other state courts upholding the
validity of retaliatory laws, the retaliatory provision against foreign
corporations has been held unconstitutional. 91
(d) Other taxes and fees.
Most of the states require accident and health insurance companies
to pay an annual fee with the filing of their annual statement. This fee
for the filing of the annual statement varies from five to fifty dollars.
89 198 Mass. 466, 84 14.E. 863 (1908).
90 Philadelphia Fire Assoc. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 30 L. Ed. 342, 7 S. Ct. 108
(1886); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Durfee, 164 Ill. 186, 45 N.E. 441
(1896); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Insurance Co. of No. Aim., 115 Ind. 257, 17
N.E. 574 (1888); Clay v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 168 Ky. 315, 181 S.W. 1123
(1916) ; State v. Insurance Co. of No. Am., 71 Neb. 320, 100 N.W. 405 (1904),
106 N.W. 767 (1906).
91 State v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 223 Ala. 134, 134 So. 858 (1931); Clark &
Murrell v. The Port of Mobile, 67 Ala. 217 (1880) ; See also note on Retalia-
tory tax laws in 91 A.L.R. 795.
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In some states no fee is exacted with the filing of the annual statement
unless a fee is required in other states of local companies.
Another fee which is exacted by most of the states is an annual
charge for a certificate of authority. This fee also varies greatly, the
amount being five dollars in some states and up to three hundred fifty
dollars in the State of North Carolina, where a company writing both
accident and health insurance must pay this sum for a certificate of
authority. The State of Virginia requires an annual registration fee
varying from five dollars for capital of fifteen thousand dollars em-
ployed in the state to twenty-five dollars for stock companies whose
capital is more than three hundred thousand dollars. Some states
(North Carolina, etc.) require all companies to maintain a general
agent in the state and all companies must secure a general agent's li-
cense for which the state collects a fee. The states also require local,
district and special agents' licenses and the payment of a fee to the state
for such licenses. In some states insurance company adjusters, if other
than local, must pay a fee. In Florida such fee is ten dollars regardless
of the number of companies represented.
Some states exact in addition a small tax often based on gross
premiums for maintaining the Bureau or Department of Insurance.
In Montana for example, a corporation license tax is required. This
tax is based on the net income of the corporation from Montana sour-
ces. Alabama likewise exacts a tax known as a corporation permit fee
based on the capital employed in the state, the minimum being a fee
of five dollars.
Many states require corporations doing business in the state to pay
an income tax, but insurance companies doing business in the state and
paying a premium tax on premiums received in the state are generally
exempt from the income tax requirements.
PART FOUR
TAxATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
(1) Nature and source of power of local subdivisions to tax and
limitation thereon.
As we have noted hereinbefore, the power to tax is an essential and
inherent attribute of every independent government or state. And, ex-
cept in so far as this power is restricted by the provisions of the Fed-
eral or State Constitution, the state's power of taxation, if exercised for
a public purpose, is absolute and unlimited.
There has been a claim advanced that local governments, that is,
counties, towns, cities, villages and other political subdivisions of the
state, have inherent powers of taxation. This claim is apparently based
on the theory that the Magna Charta recognized such rights before the
establishment of the American colonies and that these rights formed a
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part of the existing power in the colonial governments at the time of
the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Though this claim may have
been recognized in a few instances, yet the almost universal rule in
America is that the right of a municipality to control its own affairs is
dependent upon constitutional or legislative authority. This is on the
theory that since a municipal corporation is solely a creature of the
state, it has no inherent power. To the extent that the power to tax
is exercised by a municipality it is merely a delegated power, subject
to repeal or modification and subject to such restrictions and limitations
as may be placed upon it by constitution or statute.92 Hence, a munici-
pality may levy a tax upon the insurance business only when permitted
by constitution or statute so to do.
It should be noted that in some cases the state constitutions provide
directly for assessment and collection of taxes by counties, cities, towns
or other local subdivisions. Occasionally a limitation is placed upon the
purpose and extent of this delegated power to tax. In some cases the
state constitution authorizes the legislature to confer the right to tax
upon local polifical subdivisions. Ordinarily, such a provision is not
self-executing but requires legislative action to confer the power to tax.
Because of the large number of taxes imposed by counties, cities,
towns, villages and other local subdivisions, an enumeration thereof is
difficult. It should be noted, however, that the amount of taxes col-
lected by local municipalities is very large and that the most importazit
item of local taxation is the general property tax.
(2) Taxation of the insurance business by local subdivisions.
The following questions frequently are asked: (1) How many
states empower local governments to tax the insurance business? and,
(2) How many municipalities which are authorized by law to tax in-
surance companies are presently exercising the power?
Almost one-half of the states in America today-chiefly in the mid-
dle west and in the south-authorize taxation of the insurance business
by local governments, that is, by counties, towns, cities, villages or other
political subdivigions. Taxes of this type may in general take the form
of a tax imposed upon either (1) the insurance agent for the privilege
of engaging in the business of selling insurance, or (2) the insurance
agency for the privilege of selling insurance as a business, or (3) the
insurance company for the privilege of operating within the territorial
limits of the municipality imposing the tax.93
The privilege tax imposed by local governments upon the insurance
agent for the privilege of engaging in the occupation of selling insur-
92 Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U.S. 189, 32 L. Ed. 915 (1889). Cooley, The
Law of Taxation, 4th Ed., vol. 1, section 75 et seq.
93 Averett, Lloyd B., Local Taxation of the Insurance Business in the United
States, 9 Tax Magazine 438, 453 (1931), 10 Tax Magazine 17, 31 (1932).
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ance may take one or more of three forms: first, a flat tax for a stated
period of time and without regard to the amount or types of insurance
sold; second, a flat tax as stated above plus an additional fee based upon
the number of companies represented by the agent; and third, fees the
amount of which vary with respect to the types of companies repre-
sented.
In the levying of taxes upon insurance agencies by local govern-
ments the practice as to method and rate of taxation has varied quite
widely. In some cases the municipality has adopted a flat tax for all
agencies regardless of type or size. The tax has varied in some cases
in accordance with the number of companies represented by the agency
or in accordance with the number of agents employed. In other cases
the tax has been based solely upon the type of agency obtaining the
license.
The taxes imposed upon insurance companies are usually levied
either at flat rates or as a percentage of the gross premiums. For ex-
ample, the City of Shreveport, Louisiana, in its license ordinance adopt-
ed December 28, 1920, provided for a license tax of life and accident
insurance companies, and provided further that the tax shall be based
on the gross annual premiums on "all risks located within the city and
all risks located elsewhere contracted for in" the city. The ordinance
created thirty-nine classes based on gross premiums received by the
companies with the taxes varying from a tax of -one hundred forty
dollars when the premiums are less than thirty thousand dollars, to a
tax of two thousand eight hundred eighty dollars when the premiums
are four hundred thousand dollars or more.
The validity of local ordinances taxing insurance companies often
depends upon the power of the local government to enact such an or-
dinance. Grants of power to municipalities to impose a tax on occupa-
tions are usually strictly construed especially where the sole purpose of
the ordinance is to raise revenue.94 And, a municipality cannot, by
assuming to act under the police power, impose a tax for revenue pur-
poses where it has no authority to impose a revenue tax.95
If, however, the constitution and statutes authorize the imposition
of a license fee upon insurance companies, ordinances which levy such
a fee will be upheld.
Thus, in Kentucky96 the statutes provide that the general council
of cities of the first class "shall, by ordinance, provide for the follow-
ing licenses, to be paid into the sinking fund, * * *:
"Insurance company. Every life, fire or accident, casualty
and indemnity insurance company, title company, title insurance
94Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th Ed., vol. 4, p. 3386.
95 Borough v. American Nat. Gas Co., 239 Pa. 210, 86 AtI. 717 (1913).9r Baldwins, Kentucky Statutes, 1936 Revision, Section 3011.
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company, or abstract company, doing business in said city, shall,
on or before the first day of February of each year, pay to the
sinking fund not less than $2.00 nor more than $3.00 on every
hundred dollars of premiums received on business done in the
city during the previous year."
The Kentucky court in considering the validity of the above section
held that under sections 174 and 181 of the constitution, this section of
the Kentucky statutes was a valid exercise of power and that an or-
dinance enacted pursuant to such section of the statutes is valid.9 7
A few years ago many insurance companies refused to pay the
municipal taxes levied on insurance premiums in Caddo Parish,
Louisiana, on the ground that these taxes were an unlawful burden
on interstate commerce. Similar action was at that time contemplated
with respect to municipal premium taxes elsewhere.9 8  The view
that these taxes were invalid was based upon the ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Nippert v. Richmond9
holding invalid a local licensing ordinance as applied to a foreign cor-
poration doing business in the municipality levying the tax. The Nip-
pert case involved a salesman representing an out-of-state manufac-
turer who was charged by Richmond, Virginia, authorities with failure
to pay the city tax of a fifty dollar flat license fee for the first year,
and one-half of one per cent on gross earnings each year thereafter.
The Court held that this tax could not be defended on the ground that
it was a "local incident" (here solicitation by the salesman) since in
practically every state some local incident could be found on which to
hang a tax. The Nippert case merely reiterated and applied the rule
in effect since 1887 that a flat fee license by municipalities is an unlaw-
ful interference with interstate commerce. 00 However, this doctrine
has been narrowly limited by the Court to apply only to flat fee licenses
and only to the solicitation of orders for the purchase of goods which
are later shipped into the state to the buyer pursuant to such order.
However, insurance companies, just as other companies, are subject to
state and local taxation if there is no undue burden on interstate com-
merce or if the transaction does not involve interstate commerce. 10'
After the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the state
premium tax cases, the Louisiana local tax cases were all settled.
Taxation of insurance companies in the form of municipal premium
taxes is highly objectionable to the companies. Therefore, it is not
surprising to see resistance develop to such taxes. One of the reasons
9 Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Louisville, 106 Ky. 207, 50 S.W. 35 (1899).
98 National Underwriter, April 5, 1946, p. 1.99 Nippert v. Ricltond, 327 U.S. 416, 90 L. Ed. 760, 66 S. Ct. 586 (1946).
'00Robbins v. Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 30 L. Ed. 694, 7 S. Ct. 592 (1887).
10, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjanin, 328 U.S. 408, 90 L. Ed. 1342, 66 S. Ct. 1142
(1946).
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for resisting payment of such local taxes is the multiplicity of such
taxes. The most obnoxious of these taxes is the flat license fee since
the companies must pay such tax even though only a small amount of
business is done in the municipality levying the tax.
PART FIVE
CAN THE TAXATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS BE CONTROLLED?
It is manifest that the insurance companies cannot directly control
the taxation of the insurance business. Taxes are levied by Congress,
the several state legislatures and by local taxing authorities, and any
control of taxation must come indirectly through control of the body
which levies the tax. The amount of revenue to be used annually is
determined by the needs of government. As the cost of government in-
creases the need for additional revenue likewise increases. During the
past two decades increasing pressure from all sides for more revenue
due, in part, to the added complexity of our society and, in part, to the
late depression and World War II has led to the tapping of new sources
for taxes, and to the increasing of the tax rate and the broadening of
the tax base to unprecedented levels.
Few people or corporations object to paying their fair share of the
cost of government, such payment being based upon either ability to
pay or upon benefits or protection bestowed by the government or both.
However, a tax imposed merely because it is easy to collect or because
it is thought the taxpayer has huge so-called "free assets" available
out of which the tax may be collected, where the tax is not based either
on ability to pay or on benefits received or on any other recognized
theory of taxation, is very objectionable even where legal. It seems
clear that many of the taxes imposed upon the insurance business are
levied, in part, because of the fallacious theory-which is altogether
too prevalent-that insurance companies have large amounts of "free
assets" which may be tapped for revenue purposes with impunity
and without any particular damage to the companies or the policy-
holders. This notion is entirely erroneous and an effort should be made
to correct it in order that the harm which threatens the insurance busi-
ness because of discriminatory taxes may be escaped.
Taxes levied by the states upon insurance companies were orig-
inally based upon the amount of premiums received by the com-
pany in the state in exchange for protection accorded by the state and
in payment of the cost of supervising such companies in the interests of
the insurance buying public. The purpose in levying this type of tax
was primarily to pay for the cost of state supervision. At that time the
premium tax unquestionably was a justifiable tax. Today, however, an
analysis of taxes paid by the insurance business discloses that less than
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five cents out of every dollar collected is spent for government super-
vision of insurance and that the balance, or about ninety-five cents out
of every dollar of tax collected, is used for general revenue purposes.
It would seem that the taxes collected from the insurance business to-
day are somewhat out of line insofar as the benefits received by the
insurance companies are concerned. And, even though the tax rates
remain the same, it is obvious that the amount of taxes paid yearly by
the insurance business has been and will continue to mount steadily
due to the consistently increasing yearly gain in premium volume in
nearly all lines of insurance. It is estimated that health and accident
insurance companies pay annually a total of more than twenty million
dollars in taxes.
The states of the Union in the early history of taxation imposed
taxes mainly upon property of persons, partnerships and corporations.
Excise taxes were not favored at that time and it was not until the
need for additional funds owing to the growing complexity of our so-
ciety began to be acute that the several states undertook to exercise
their authority to levy excise taxes. This usually took the form of a
tax for the privilege of doing business in the state. These taxes which
in the beginning were small in amount have increased both in rate and
amount until today they yield a large source of revenue to the state.
There will be no decrease in the tax rate in the very near future, but
on the contrary if the Federal Government's or state's need for revenue
becomes pressing an increase might be expected.
How, then, can the tax burden imposed upon the insurance business
be controlled? Of course, it is impossible to do away with all taxes and
no one expects nor wants all government activities eliminated entirely
nor even curtailed to an extent that government ceases to function
properly. All that is asked is that useless government activities be
curbed and that the tax imposed upon the insurance business be fair
and not confiscatory.
It would seem clear from the ever mounting burden of taxes placed
upon the insurance business that these companies must be vigilant to
protect their interests when measures affecting them are considered, to
the end that the insurance business be not taxed out of existence. In-
surance, and particularly accident and health insurance, is too vital, too
important to the community and to the public welfare to be made the
subject of confiscatory taxation. A continuous study of the problem of
taxation should be undertaken by the insurance industry in order that
Congress and the several state legislatures may be accurately informed
of the true relationship between taxation and the cost of insurance to
the individual. If the cost of accident and health insurance rises be-
yond the means of the average individual its usefulness to the com-
munity and the state will be seriously impaired.
[Vol. 32
TAXATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES
PART SIx
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the statutes relating to taxation of insurance com-
panies discloses the following: (1) that there is no uniformity among
the several states in the taxation of the insurance business, (2) that due
in part to this lack of uniformity and in part to retaliatory statutes
much confusion on the subject exists, (3) that the imposition of taxes
by local governments, towns, villages and cities, and the like, while not
burdensome in most cases, is extremely annoying and inconvenient and
requires a great deal of additional work on the part of the companies,
and (4) that during the last decade or two the trend definitely has been
and now is toward increased taxation of the insurance business.
Probably the ultimate solution of the problem of taxation of the
insurance business lies in the enactment by all the states of a uniform
tax law so drawn as to protect the several states against tax evasion
and against undue advantages which the companies might claim, and
which at the same time would protect the insurance business so that
it would not pay more than its just share of the expense of government.
Such uniform leglislation would also remove any serious objection to
th imposition of multiple taxes on the insurance companies in the
several states. Such uniform state tax statutes relating to the taxation
of insurance companies will be adopted only if the need therefor is
effectively demonstrated by the insurance industry. Moreover, if the
taxation of insurance companies and their agents by local governments
were eliminated, it would further simplify the tax problem. There
probably would be some objection on the part of those local communi-
ties which now impose a tax on the insurance business to this loss of
existing revenue but such communities could be reimbursed by the
state for their loss of such revenue by a division of state premium taxes
with local communities.
The solution to the menace of ever mounting taxes on insurance,
while neither an easy nor simple one, is nevertheless within the grasp of
the insurance industry. Certainly it is worth striving for. The lower
the cost of insurance the more the benefits of insurance will be ex-
tended to the masses and particularly among the lower income group
that has the greatest need for complete insurance coverage.
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